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IN llll Ml Ml i n l l k l iK UTI \\ S

THE STATE OF I I I A I I
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v,
Al l-X

CaseNc ).20030310-C \
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Aggravated
Robbers, ii firsl deyrce tHon in inl.iinm ni I mill i '(Hit uini

o i> MI " i I'HIM), W \\\\ ,m

enhanced penalty pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 2002), in the Third
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Judge,
presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting Montiel's plea
bargain because the trial coin t failed to consider all legally relevant factors, exceeded the
limits prescribed by law, and applied lis discretion arbitrarily.
Standard of Review: This Court ,freview[s] a trial court's acceptance or rejection
of a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188,
1JHM yoilltali i i /\(T I1'

•

PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
Appellant Alex Montiel's (Montiel) argument that the trial court abused its
discretion by rejecting Montiel's plea agreement is preserved at Court Record (R.) 200
(Pretrial Conference Transcript).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are determinative of
the issues on appeal. Their text is provided in full in Addendum B.
United States Constitution Article I, Section 8 - The Legislative Branch - Scope of
Legislative Power;
United States Constitution Article II, Section 2 - The Presidency - Presidential
Power;
United States Constitution Article III, Section 2 - The Judiciary - Scope of Judicial
Power;
Utah Constitution Article V, Section 1 - Distribution of Powers - Three
Departments of Government;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999) - Aggravated Robbery;
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e) - Pleas.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Montiel was charged by information with one count of aggravated robbery, a first
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), with an enhancement
for committing the offense in concert with two or more persons, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 2002). R. 4-5. Montiel pleaded not guilty. R. 30. The State

and Montiel reached a plea agreement and presented it to the trial court at a pretrial
conference on December 13, 2002. See R. 200 (attached at Addendum,. C) I lie ti ial

2002. See R. 201-203. Montiel was convicted of aggravated robbery with the gang
enhancement and sentenced to ten years to life at the Utah State Prison, R 172-73.
Montiel is currently incarcerated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the December 13, 2002 pretrial conference, the State informed the trial court
that it had reached a plea agreement with Montiel. See R. 200:4. Under this agreement,
Montiel agreed to plead guilty to a third degree felony charge in exchange for the first
clegiTf fi/lriri) nhatut: h u m (hopped, See K1 I he Mali e\pl nurd thai ill nns niki nip
this plea because "there are some facts that... make the story not as presentable to the
jury and I would rather accept the

lesser plea than run the risk of (inaudible)." LcL In

response, the trial court noted the State had charged Montiel with a first degree felony
with pant" ami fiieann ailiaiirniicnh ' and ,i,anl "Will I ill in I • '.live (in:.inns
enhancements, folks. You plead them, they're stuck unless I'm convinced that there was
some mistake in pleading." Id.
I >efense aiiin a I Illicit spoke, explaining that Ihur's .IIIMI (lie additional icanon

1

Use ot a dangerous weapon was actually an element of it le chai ged ci in le See
R. 4-5; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1 )(a) (1999)
3

judicial economy." Id at 4-5. The trial court responded:
I don't care about judicial economy when people are alleged
to have used firearms in the commission of a crime. I'll take
whatever time is necessary to resolve the issue properly.
I'm not going to waive the firearms enhancement.
Unless you can tell me you don't have any evidence^] that he
didn't have a firearm or there wasn't a firearm or your
witness is lying.
I d at 5.
Next, the State again explained the need for the plea agreement, saying, "It's just
. . . a matter of weighing . . . the case. I mean, there are facts-that is the story that is told
by the . . . complaining witness," but "sometimes it's better to have the . . . verdict in
hand than . . . two in the bush. And there's sometimes that the jury may just say, oh, to
heck with this and . . . they lose it." Id. The State continued, "I think this person is a
dangerous person. My objective, I think, and my duties to the taxpayers of the State is to
take this person, who[m] I believe to be a dangerous person, and lock him up." IdL_ at 56. Responding, the trial court asked, "Lock him up for zero to five, what kind of a deal is
that?" Id at 6. The State answered, "It's better than zero to zero," and explained that the
plea agreement had been approved by the district attorney authorized to accept plea
agreements in "short-term situation^]." Id
Continuing, the State explained it had also talked to the alleged victim in regard to
a previous plea agreement but not in regard to the current plea. Id. Interrupting, the trial
court said:

4

Remember the case that Justice Wilkins wrote where he
accused the District Attorney's office and the trial judge of
running rampant over victim's rights by not telling them
what's going on and that little fiasco out in Tooele? I don't
think [the District Attorney] wants to have to undergo that
again without at least an opportunity to look at this. I know I
don't.... [W]e haven't even told the person who claims all
these things occurred as to what are you going to do. I think
he's entitled to know.
Iu, it 6 7.

Finally, the trul i uurf ivjivlrd thr pk\i aprccmiml s<n in,1. "1 in mil gomj.? b .tllim
the filing of this amended Information at this point and I'm not going to accept any plea
to a third-degree felony on the basis of what I've heard." IdL at 7,
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Section I: A trial court may only reject a plea agreement

1

judicial discretion. In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea
agreement because it: (1) failed to consider all legally relevant factors, (2) exceeded the
limits pi escribed lb) law , ai id (3) applied its disci etioi I arbitrarily. Moreover, this Court
should reverse because the trial court's abuse of discretion ^ \ nrejudiciah
First, the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea agreement without
considering all legally relevant factors. A trial court has a duty to consider all legally
trln iinl liH'tnr hrlorr rrirdmj.1 i pirn .uyveinrnl

I u fulfill llii iluh Ihr lri.il i unit

must evaluate the circumstances of the case and determine the propriety of the particular
bargain. In this case, the trial court did not evaluate the relevant circumstances of the

5

case or determine the propriety of the particular plea. Instead, it summarily rejected the
plea based on its fixed policy that firearms enhancements should never be waived.
Second, the trial court abused its discretion by exceeding the scope of its
authority. A trial court must not usurp the State's right to prosecute. This is especially
true in plea agreements because the State is in the best position to evaluate the propriety
of a plea. Here, the trial court usurped the State's right to prosecute by rejecting the plea
agreement based on its own fixed policy and ignoring the State's conclusion that the plea
was necessary to insure incarceration time. Additionally, a trial court must not infringe
on the separation of powers. Where a proposed plea agreement deals with charging, the
trial court should only reject the plea to prevent abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Here,
the trial court infringed on the separation of powers by second-guessing the State's plea
decision even though the State exercised sound discretion in formulating the plea by
considering public interest, Montiel's interest, and judicial economy.
Third, the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea arbitrarily. A trial
court may not reject pleas on an arbitrary basis. In other words, a trial court should
accept a plea unless it can identify good reasons for rejecting it. Here, the trial court
rejected the plea arbitrarily because it selected one arbitrary fact, that Montiel was
charged with use of a firearm, to justify a blanket refusal to even consider the plea.
Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea agreement.
Moreover, this Court should reverse because the trial court's abuse of discretion

6

was prejudicial. Rather than pleading guilty to a third degree felony, Montiel was forced
by the trial court's abuse of discretion to proceed to trial where he was convicted of a
first degree felony.
Section II: Although Montiel properly preserved his claim for appeal, his claim
would merit reversal even without preservation because the trial court's abuse of
discretion was plain error. First, as discussed above, the trial court's rejection of the plea
agreement was error. Second, the error should have been obvious to the trial court
because it rejected the plea based on its own personal policy rather than on any
consideration of the facts or the law. Third, the error was harmful. If the trial court had
considered the legally relevant factors of Montiel's case and given proper deference to
the State's prosecutorial discretion, there is a substantial likelihood that the trial court
would have accepted the plea.

7

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE MONTIEL'S CONVICTION
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
REJECTING THE PLEA AGREEMENT2

Plea bargaining "is an essential component of the administration of justice" and, if
"[pjroperly administered," is "to be encouraged." Santobello v. New York. 404 U.S.
257, 260 (1971). Although there is "no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted," a
trial court may only "reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion." Santobello.
404 U.S. at 262 (citations omitted); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) (explaining that a
trial court "may refuse to accept a plea of guilty"); State v. Turner. 980 P.2d 1188, 118990 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("We review a trial court's acceptance or rejection of a guilty
plea under an abuse of discretion standard."). A trial court abuses its discretion if it "fails
to consider all legally relevant factors," Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190 (quotations and citation
omitted); "exceeds the limits prescribed by law," State v. Bluff. 2002 UT 66,lf66, 52 P.3d
1210; or applies its discretion arbitrarily. See State v. Chambers. 533 P.2d 876, 879

2

The limits of a trial court's discretion to reject guilty pleas are not yet clearly
defined by Utah case law. See State v. Turner. 980 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah Ct. App.
1998) (holding trial court abused its discretion by accepting defendant's plea "over the
timely and specific objections of the State" because this "effectively nullified] the
State's right to prosecute defendant"); State v. Mane. 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting defendant's plea after
he testified "that he had no memory of any of his actions" because "[n]othing in [Rule
11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure] requires a court to accept a guilty plea
and defendant has cited no case authority for that proposition"). However, this issue has
been widely discussed in other jurisdictions. Therefore, this brief relies largely on case
law from other jurisdictions.
8

(Utah 1975) (holding trial court's judgment "should not be disturbed" if its "discretion is
reasonably used, and is not shown to have been abused, arbitrary or capricious").
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting Montiel's guilty plea
because: (A) it failed to consider all legally relevant factors, (B) it exceeded the scope of
its authority, and (C) it applied its discretion arbitrarily. Moreover, this Court should
reverse Montiel's conviction because the trial court's abuse of discretion was prejudicial.
A.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing to Consider All Legally
Relevant Factors
A trial court has a duty, before rejecting a plea agreement, to "consider all legally

relevant factors." Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190 (quotations and citation omitted). Inherent in
this duty is the "obligation to consider seriously the proffered plea." Sparks v. State, 759
P.2d 180, 184 (Nev. 1988). In other words, before rejecting a plea agreement, the trial
court must "evaluate the circumstances of the case and determine the propriety of the
particular bargain." Stacks v. State, 372 N.E.2d 1201, 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978)
(quotations and citations omitted). In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by
rejecting Montiel's plea without considering all legally relevant factors because it: (1)
failed to evaluate the circumstances of the case, and (2) failed to determine the propriety
of the particular plea bargain.
1.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing to Evaluate the
Circumstances of Montiel's Case.
A trial court has the duty to evaluate the circumstances of a case before rejecting a

9

plea agreement. See Stacks, 372 N.E.2d at 1207. This means a trial court must
determine, "in light of the entire criminal event and given the defendant's prior criminal
record[,] whether the plea bargain enables the court to dispose of the case in a manner
commensurate with the seriousness of the criminal charges and the character and
background of the defendant." State v. Sears. 542 S.E.2d 863, 867 (W. Va. 2000); s_ee_
also Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B) ("The court... may not accept a plea until the court
has found . . . there is a factual basis for the plea."); Daniels v. State, 453 N.E.2d 160,
164 (Ind. 1983) (holding a trial court has the "responsibility to determine the factual basis
of the plea") (quotations and citations omitted)); State v. Hines. 919 S.W.2d 573, 578
(Tenn. 1995) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting a plea because it
reviewed the facts and "felt that the facts of the case, even when mitigating
circumstances were considered, should be decided by a jury"); State v. Reuschel, 312
A.2d 739, 744 (Vt. 1973) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting a
plea because it reviewed the circumstances of the plea and found a "lack of factual basis
for the plea").
For example, in Daniels, the appellate court found the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by rejecting a plea because it "carefully considered the evidence presented at
the guilty plea hearing and the presentence investigation report," was aware the victim's
wife "wanted the plea agreement," "realized that a lot of people had put a great deal of
time into arranging the plea," and "was concerned with affording the proper credibility

10

and respect to the death penalty statute." Daniels. 453 N.E.2d at 165. Conversely, in
Sears, where the trial court rejected a plea because it was presented after the courtimposed deadline, the appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion because it
"summarily refuse[d] to consider the substantive terms of the agreement solely because
of the timing of the presentation of the agreement to the court." Sears, 542 S.E.2d at
868.
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea agreement
without evaluating any circumstances of Montiel's case. Rather than considering the
criminal event in whole or part, the trial court merely stated its belief that a firearms
enhancement was applicable and summarily rejected the plea because it would not
"waive firearms enhancements." R. 200:4-5. Accordingly, the trial court failed to
evaluate any of the circumstances necessary to make a proper ruling on the plea bargain.
For example, the trial court did not evaluate Montiel's character, background, or
presentence report, as necessary to determine whether a plea bargain was appropriate in
his case. See |dL at 4-7. The trial court also did not consider any evidence of the charged
crime, thereby rejecting the plea without determining whether the facts of the case were
conducive to a plea bargain. See. id Further, the trial court failed to consider the
victim's actual desires. See id Although the trial court did ask the State what the victim
thought of the plea bargain, it interrupted the State's answer and summarily concluded
the victim disapproved. See id at 6-7. Finally, the trial court overlooked the time and

11

energy spent in creating the plea agreement and ignored the State's reasons for believing
the agreement necessary. See id, at 4-6. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion
by failing to consider any circumstances specific to Montiel's case.
2.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Rejecting MontiePs Plea Without
Determining the Propriety of the Particular Bargain Proposed.
A trial court has the duty to determine the propriety of a proposed plea agreement

before rejecting it. See Stacks, 372 N.E.2d at 1207; see also State v. Clanton. 612 P.2d
662, 665 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980) ("[J]udicial discretion implies the liberty to act as a judge
should act, applying the rules and analogies of the law to the facts found after weighing
and examining the evidence"). This duty requires a trial court to apply "independent
consideration . . . in each case, and reject the use of fixed policies." State v. Hager, 630
N.W.2d 828, 834, 835 (Iowa 2001) (citations omitted) (explaining that "efficiency must
always be compatible with fairness, and fairness must consider the fundamental
principles which drive our system of justice and the rights and liberties of each
individual").
For example, in Hager. the appellate court found the trial court abused its
discretion by rejecting a plea agreement based solely on its fixed policy not to accept plea
agreements reached after the court-imposed deadline. See Hager, 630 N.W.2d at 837.
Instead, the trial court should have considered the case and determined additional
reasons, beyond its fixed policy, for rejecting the particular plea proposed. See id.; see
also Hockadav v. United States. 359 A.2d 146, 148-49 (D.C. 1976) (holding trial court
12

abused its discretion by making a "blanket refusal" to hear discussion on a proposed
plea).
Similarly, in this case, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to determine
the propriety of the proposed plea bargain. The trial court created a fixed policy that it
would not "waive firearm enhancements." R. 200:4-5. It then used this fixed policy to
cast a blanket rejection over Montiel's plea without ever considering the plea's particular
propriety. See kL In other words, the trial court rejected the plea without ever
determining whether the plea was appropriate.
For example, the trial court did not determine whether the plea was appropriate in
light of the entire charged crime. See Sears, 542 S.E.2d at 867 (holding a trial court must
determine, "in light of the entire criminal event... whether the plea bargain enables the
court to dispose of the case in a manner commensurate with the seriousness of the
criminal charges and the character and background of the defendant"). It also did not
determine whether the plea was appropriate under rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Specifically, it did not determine whether there was a factual basis for the
plea or whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e).
Further, it did not determine whether the State's reasons for entering the plea agreement
were appropriate in light of public interest. See Section LB. Finally, it did not
determine whether its ownfixedpolicy against waiving firearms enhancements was
appropriately applied to Montiel's case since Montiel was not actually charged with a

13

firearms enhancement. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999). Therefore, the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to determine the propriety of Montiel's particular
plea agreement.
2$.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Exceeding the Scope of Its
Authority
Although a trial court has discretion to accept or reject a plea agreement, "the

exercise of that discretion is circumscribed by the nature of the trial judge's role in the
plea bargaining process." Hockaday, 359 A.2d at 148. The trial court must not, in the
exercise of its discretion, infringe on the prosecutorial power of the State. See e.g.,
Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190 (holding trial court's acceptance of defendant's guilty plea to
lesser included offense "over the timely and specific objections of the State was unfair
and unreasonable, effectively nullifying the State's right to prosecute defendant on the
[greater offense] charge"). In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by infringing
on the State's prosecutorial power because it: (1) usurped the State's right to prosecute,
and (2) disregarded the separation of powers.
1.

The Trial Court Exceeded the Scope of Its Authority By Usurping the State's
Right to Prosecute.
The State has a "right to prosecute" and has an "interest in an error free

determination of the case." Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190 (quotations and citations omitted).
Inherent in its right to prosecute is the State's knowledge of how best to prosecute a case.
See United States v. Ammidown. 497 F.2d 615, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding the

14

prosecutor "alone is in a position to evaluate the government's prosecution resources and
the number of cases it is able to prosecute"); United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423,
1438 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Courts do not know which charges are best initiated at which
time, which allocation of prosecutorial resources is most efficient, or the relative
strengths of various cases and charges." (citations omitted)); Sandy v. Fifth Judicial Dist.
Ct, 935 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Nev. 1997) (same).
Accordingly, because the State has the right to prosecute and is in the best
position to evaluate a case, its decision to enter a plea agreement "is to be followed in the
overwhelming number of cases." Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 621; see also Sandy, 935 P.2d
at 1151 (noting prosecutors have discretion to determine whether a plea should be
accepted due to "insufficiency of trial evidence, doubt as to the admissibility of certain
evidence," "the need to bring another felon to justice," "uncertain success or conserving
prosecutorial resources, or any other separate factor necessitating acceptance of the
plea").
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by usurping the State's right to
prosecute. The State's attorney decided to enter a plea agreement because he had
uncovered facts that made "the story not as presentable to the jury." R. 200:4. After
"weighing the case," he decided the chosen plea agreement was best because it would
assure Montiel, whom he believed was "a dangerous person," would be incarcerated. IcL
at 5-6. He also considered "judicial economy" and spoke to the victim about accepting a

15

plea.3 Id. at 4-5, 6. He then obtained approval for this plea agreement from a
supervising district attorney empowered to approve plea agreements. Id. at 6.
At the pretrial conference, the State's attorney explained the need for a plea
agreement to the trial court. See id. at 4-6. However, the trial court refused to consider
the plea and entirely disregarded the State's reasons for the agreement. See id. at 4-7. It
refused to acknowledge either the State's determination that the evidence was
insufficient to proceed to trial or the State's fear of uncertain success if required to go to
trial. See idL at 4-5, 7. Instead, it said it would not consider a plea agreement at all
because it would not "waive firearms enhancements." Id. at 4. In fact, the trial court said
the State, because it chose to plead a firearms enhancement, was "stuck" with it unless
there was evidence to show "there wasn't a firearm or [the] witness [was] lying." IcL at
4-5. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by usurping the State's right to
prosecute.
2.

The Trial Court Exceeded Its Authority By Infringing On the Separation of
Powers.
The trial court's role in the plea bargaining process is governed by the separation

of powers, which "mandates the judiciary remain independent of executive affairs and
vice versa." Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1437 (citations omitted); see Springer v. Government

3

It is not clear from the record whether the victim approved of this or any other
plea agreement because the trial court stopped the State's description of its conversation
with the victim. See R. 200:6-7.
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of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928) (noting the separation of powers doctrine
is "implicit" in the United States Constitution); Utah Const. Art. V, Sec. 1 ("The powers
of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments,
the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise
of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions
appertaining to either of the others."). "Plea agreements are not solely within the realm
of courts." Hager, 630 N.W.2d at 834 (citations omitted). "While plea agreements that
impact sentencing powers of courts generally fall within the discretion of the court, plea
bargains which involve charging decisions are primarily within the discretion of the
prosecutor."4 Id. (citations omitted); see also Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1437 (explaining that
"charge bargains implicate executive discretion" and are "primarily a matter of discretion
for the prosecution").
Accordingly, when considering a charge bargain, the trial court "does not have
primary responsibility [of determining the appropriate plea], but rather the [secondary]
role of guarding against abuse of prosecutorial discretion." Hockadav, 359 A.2d at 148

4

Although charge bargains "implicate the sentencing discretion of [trial] courts,"
"the court's sentencing discretion is implicated only as an incidental consequence of the
prosecution's exercise of executive discretion." United States v. Robertson. 45 F.3d
1423, 1438 (10th Cir. 1995). "In fact, a court's sentencing discretion is implicated in this
situation in precisely the same manner it is implicated by prosecutorial decisions to bring
charges in the first place, where prosecutorial discretion is nearly absolute." IdL_ "As
such, charge bargains directly and primarily implicate prosecutorial discretion whereas
judicial discretion is impacted only secondarily." IdL
17

(quotations and citation omitted); see also Robertson. 45 F.3d at 1438 (f![W]hile [trial]
courts may reject charge bargains in the sound exercise of judicial discretion, concerns
relating to the doctrine of separation of powers counsel hesitancy before second-guessing
prosecutorial choices.11); Sandy. 935 P.2d at 1150-51 ("Judicial power to reject plea
bargains serves to modify and condition the absolute power of the prosecutor, consistent
with the doctrine of separation of powers, by establishing a check on the abuse of
prosecutorial (executive) prerogatives." (citations omitted)).
In fulfilling the role of guardian, the trial court has the authority "to assure
protection of the public interest," involving: "(a) fairness to the defense, such as
protection against harassment; (b) fairness to the prosecution interest, as in avoiding a
disposition that does not serve due and legitimate prosecutorial interests; [and] (c)
protection of the sentencing authority reserved to the judge." Ammidown, 497 F.2d at
622. Thus, the "judge may withhold approval if he finds that the prosecutor has failed to
give consideration to factors that must be given consideration in the public interest,
factors such as the deterrent aspects of the criminal law." Id. "However, trial judges are
not free to withhold approval of guilty pleas on this basis merely because their
conception of the public interest differs from that of the prosecuting attorney." IcL_ "The
question is not what the judge would do if he were the prosecuting attorney, but whether
he can say that the action of the prosecuting attorney is such a departure from sound
prosecutorial principle as to mark it an abuse of prosecutorial discretion." Id.; see also

18

Sparks, 759 P.2d at 184-85 (same); Hockadav. 359 A.2d at 148 ("If no proper cause
exists to vitiate the plea, the trial court is obliged to accept it." (citation omitted)).
Specifically, a "trial judge may not reject a plea bargain solely on the grounds that
the plea prevents the judge from sentencing as harshly as he or she would like." Sandy,
935 P.2d at 1151. This would afford "judges too much discretion to inhibit the role of
the prosecutor." Id.
For example, in Ammidown, the trial court rejected a plea agreement because "it
found that the crime was so heinous and the evidence of guilt so overwhelming that the
public interest would be ill-served by [the plea agreement], which it referred to as a 'tap
on the wrist.'" Ammidown. 497 F.2d at 618. The appellate court determined the trial
court abused its discretion because it rejected the plea agreement based on what it
"independently considered best in the public interest." Id. at 623. Instead, it should have
determined whether the prosecution's public interest determination was an abuse of
discretion. Id. at 622-23.
Similarly, in Sandy, the trial court rejected a plea agreement because it
disapproved of the disparity between the punishment allowed under the original charge
and the punishment allowed under the plea bargain. See Sandy. 935 P.2d at 1149. On
appeal, the reviewing court determined the trial court abused its discretion because
"disparity alone is insufficient to reject a plea bargain without evidence that the
prosecution had no valid reason for not proceeding to trial." IcL_ at 1152.
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In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by violating the separation of
powers. The offered plea agreement proposed to lower the charge from a first degree
felony to a third degree felony. See R. 200:4. Thus, it was a charge bargain that
primarily implicated the prosecutorial powers of the State.
Moreover, the State's attorney, in reaching the charge bargain, exercised proper
discretion by formulating the plea based on public interest, Montiel's interest, and
judicial economy. See id. at4-6. First, the State's attorney carefully considered public
interest. See id at 4-5. After "weighing the case" and determining certain facts made the
case "not as presentable to the jury," he decided a plea was necessary. IdL Otherwise, he
concluded, he would not be doing his duty "to the taxpayers of the State" because he
could not insure Montiel, a person "dangerous" to the public, would be incarcerated. I(L_
at 5-6. Second, the State's attorney considered Montiel's interest. See id. at 4. By
entering a plea agreement with Montiel, the State's attorney offered Montiel the
opportunity to forgo trial and take responsibility for the crime. See id.; see also Hager,
630 N.W.2d at 833 (noting plea agreements allow "defendants who acknowledge guilt to
spare themselves . . . an expensive trial"). Third, the State's attorney considered judicial
economy. See R. 200:4-5. Using his superior knowledge of pending cases and charges,
the State's attorney concluded judicial economy would best be served by pleading
Montiel's case and freeing the trial court's schedule for other cases. See id.; see also
Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1438 ("Courts do not know which charges are best initiated at
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which time, which allocation of prosecutorial resources is most efficient, or the relative
strengths of various cases and charges." (citations omitted)).
Accordingly, the trial court was obligated to accept the charge bargain because the
State's attorney exercised proper discretion in formulating it. However, rather than
accepting the State's proposed plea or even reviewing it for abuse of prosecutorial
discretion, the trial court entirely disregarded it. See R. 200:4-7. Regardless of the
State's determination that the plea agreement would serve public interest, Montiel's
interest, and judicial economy, the trial court rejected the plea because it personally did
not "waive firearms enhancements." LI at 4. This determination undermined the State's
proper exercise of discretion and forced it to try a case that it believed was against the
public interest to try.5 See id. at 4-6. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by
infringing on the separation of powers.
C.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Applying Its Discretion Arbitrarily
A trial court may not "reject pleas on an arbitrary basis." United States v.

Maddox. 48 F.3d 555, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also People v. Jasper.
17 P.3d 807, 813-14 (Colo. 2001) (same). Instead, it "must provide a reasoned exercise

5

The trial court's determination also prevents the State from fulfilling its duty to
charge and prosecute other defendants involved in firearms crimes. Because the trial
court will not waive firearms enhancements, it forces the State to choose between
charging a defendant with use of a firearm and risking ultimate loss if it cannot present
sufficient evidence at trial to show use of a firearm, and not charging a defendant with
use of a firearm to preserve its ability to reach a plea agreement later. See R. 200:4-5.
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of discretion in order to justify a departure from the course agreed on by the prosecution
and defense." Maddox. 48 F.3d at 558 (quotations and citations omitted).
For example, in Maddox, the appellate court determined the trial court abused its
discretion by rejecting the defendant's second plea agreement because his first plea had
appeared involuntary. See IdL at 558-59. Instead, the trial court "was obligated to
provide a reasoned exercise of discretion before rejecting [the defendant's plea again."
Id. at 559 (quotations and citation omitted).
Similarly, in Hockaday, the appellate court found the trial court abused its
discretion by making a "blanket refusal" to hear discussion on a proposed plea solely
because the "trial had been too much trouble." Hockaday, 359 A.2d at 148-49. The
appellate court explained that, where "a disposition has been agreed upon by both the
defendant and the government, the trial court must identify good reasons for a departure
from following that course. If no proper cause exists to vitiate the plea, the trial court is
obliged to accept it." IcL at 148.
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by arbitrarily rejecting Montiel's
plea agreement. The trial court did not provide a reasoned exercise of discretion to
explain why it was rejecting Montiel's plea or identify any good reasons for rejecting the
plea. See R. 200. Instead, it applied a blanket refusal to consider the plea because
Montiel was charged with using a firearm. See id. at 4-5. By selecting one specific fact
at the expense of all other relevant facts to mechanically reject Montiel's plea, the trial
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court acted arbitrarily and abused its discretion.6 See id.
Moreover, the trial court's arbitrary use of judicial discretion directly contradicted
public policy. Plea bargains are encouraged because they Mafford[] the prosecutor
additional leverage in prosecuting other crimes, and allow[] defendants who
acknowledge guilt to spare themselves and the public an expensive trial.ff See Ha gen
630 N.W.2d at 833 (citations omitted). However, under the arbitrary reasoning of the
trial court, the State is automatically denied the leverage to plead cases whenever it
alleges use of a firearm. Accordingly, the State must tread carefully, deciding early
whether to allege use of a firearm and sacrifice the opportunity to plea, or not to allege
use of a firearm and retain the opportunity to plea. Further, if the State chooses to allege
use of a firearm, the defendant is automatically denied the opportunity to acknowledge
guilt and spare himself and the public an expensive trial no matter how appropriate the
proposed plea may be.
More important, if this trial court is allowed to reject Montiel's plea agreement
based solely on its personal policy to never waive firearms enhancements, then all trial
courts will be permitted to formulate personal guidelines that automatically exclude

6

This is especially true because the one fact the trial court relied on, use of a
firearm, was merely a charge. It was not yet proved beyond a reasonable doubt, see. State
v. Topham. 41 Utah 39, 123 P. 888, 889 (Utah 1912) (M[E]very man is presumed to be
innocent until proved to be guilty." (quotations and citations omitted)); and was not
conceded in the proposed guilty plea. See. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999)
(Robbery); Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999) (Attempt).
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whole classes of defendants from pleading guilty. If the trial court finds a certain
criminal practice personally repulsive, then it can develop a policy and thereafter
automatically prevent the State and defendants from pleading such cases no matter how
appropriate the proposed pleas may be. See, e.g.. Sears, 542 S.E.2d at 867 (explaining
judicial discretion is "'the exercise of judicial judgment, based on facts and guided by
law, or the equitable decision of what is just and proper under the circumstances'"
(quoting Black's Law Dictionary 467 (6th ed. 1990))).
D.

This Court Should Reverse Because the Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion
Was Prejudicial
When a trial court abuses its discretion by rejecting a plea agreement, the resulting

harm is prejudicial because, "[b]y proceeding to trial," the defendant is "exposed to a
greater possible punishment than that which could have resulted from his guilty pleas."
Hockaday, 359 A.2d at 149 (holding trial court's abuse of discretion in rejecting plea was
not "inconsequential" even though "the execution of the sentences was suspended"); see
also Maddox, 48 F.3d at 560 (holding prejudicial error was "obvious" where defendants
"were convicted of several offenses in addition to those involved in their plea
agreements").
In this case, the trial court's abuse of discretion in rejecting the plea agreement
was prejudicial. Because the trial court erroneously rejected Montiel's plea to a third
degree felony, Montiel's case went to trial and Montiel was convicted of a first degree
felony. See R. 172-73; 200:4; 201-203.
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II.

ALTHOUGH MONTIEL PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS CLAIM
FOR APPEAL, HIS CONVICTION MERITS REVERSAL
REGARDLESS OF PRESERVATION BECAUSE THE TRIAL
COURT'S ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS PLAIN ERROR

Montiel's claim was properly preserved for appeal.7 See R. 200. However,
regardless of preservation, this Court should reverse Montiel's conviction because the
trial court's abuse of discretion was plain error. "As a general rule, claims not raised
before the trial court" are not preserved. State v. Hoi gate, 2000 UT 74,1jl 1,10 P.3d 346
(citations omitted). If a claim is not preserved, a defendant may not raise it on appeal
unless he "can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error'
occurred." Id (citation omitted). Plain error exists where: (1) there is error, (2) the
"error should have been obvious to the trial court," and (3) the error is harmful. State v.
Adams, 2000 UT 42,Tf20, 5 P.3d 642 (quotations and citation omitted). In this case, the
trial court committed plain error.
First, the trial court erred by failing to consider all legally relevant factors,

7

In this case, both of the policy reasons for requiring preservation are met.
Preservation is required because: (1) "the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to
address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it," and (2) "a defendant should not be
permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of enhancing] the defendant's
chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,.. . claiming] on appeal that the Court
should reverse." State v. Hoi gate, 2000 UT 74,f 11, 10 P.3d 346 (quotations and
citations omitted) (alterations in original). Here, Montiel is not trying to overcome a
failed strategical decision. Both he and the State presented the plea agreement to the trial
court and attempted repeatedly to explain why the plea agreement was appropriate. See
R. 200:4-7. The trial court then reviewed the plea agreement and, regardless of both
parties arguments, rejected the plea agreement. See id at 7. Montiel now appeals the
trial court's rejection of the plea agreement. See id.
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exceeding the scope of its authority, and applying its discretion arbitrarily when it
rejected Montiel's plea agreement. See Section I.
Second, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. Judicial discretion
is '"the exercise of judicial judgment, based on facts and guided by law, or the equitable
decision of what is just and proper under the circumstances.'11 State v. Sears, 542 S.E.2d
863, 867 (W. Va. 2000) (quoting Blacks Law Dictionary 467 (6th ed. 1990))). In this
case, the trial court did not hear any of the facts, consider any applicable law, decide
what was just and proper under Montiel's particular circumstances, or consider the
discretion of the prosecution. See. R. 200:4-7. Instead, it rejected Montiel's plea based
solely on its personal policy to never waive firearms enhancements. See. id. at 4-5.
Under these circumstances, it should have been obvious to the trial court that it was
committing error by rejecting Montiel's plea bargain based not on the proper exercise of
its judicial discretion but on the arbitrary exercise of its personal bias toward defendants
who are charged with using a firearm.
Third, the error was harmful. Error is harmful if "the likelihood of a different
outcome [in the absence of the error is] sufficiently high [so as] to undermine confidence
in the verdict." Adams, 2000 UT 42 at ^20 (quotations and citation omitted) (alterations
in original). If the trial court had considered the legally relevant factors of Montiel's case
and deferred to the State's prosecutorial discretion, rather than summarily rejecting the
plea because Montiel was charged with using a firearm, there is a substantial likelihood
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that the trial court would have accepted the plea agreement. See. United States v.
Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding the prosecutor's decision to
enter a plea agreement "is to be followed in the overwhelming number of cases").
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Montiel's conviction because the trial court abused its
discretion by rejecting the plea agreement.
SUBMITTED this L^

day of August, 2003.

LOKfj. SEPPr"
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 021906524 FS

ALEX MONTIEL,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
February 28, 2 003

PRESENT
Clerk:
evelynt
Reporter: WARNICK, SUZANNE
Prosecutor: BURMESTER, BYRON F
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): BUCHI, HEIDI ANNE
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 13, 1979
Video
Tape Number:
2/28/03
Tape Count: 9:25/9:37
CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/18/2002 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than ten years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Case No: 021906524
Date:
Feb 28, 2003

SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Restitution Ordered to victim for $45.00 cash & $150.00 for a ring.
No credit for time served. Firearm and groug enhancement is
included in this sentence.

SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Concurrent with case #021906084
Dated this £.<% day of

.3ZJLM^

/20 Q^?.

\

:iMOTHY R. HANSON
'District Court Judge

Paae 2 (last)

ADDENDUM B

United States Constitution Article I, Section 8

Sec. 8. [Powers of Congress.]
[1.] The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States;
[2.] To borrow money on the credit of the United States;
[3.] To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes;
[4.] To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
[5.] To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and foreign Coin, and fix
the Standard of Weights and Measures;
[6.] To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and
current Coin of the United States;
[7.] To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
[8.] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries;
[9.] To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;
[10.] To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;
[11.] To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
[12.] To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that
Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
[13.] To provide and maintain a Navy;
[14.] To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces;
[15.] To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
[16.] To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers,
and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
[17.] To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular
States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of Government of the
United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the
Consent of the Legislature of the State in whiqh the Same shall be, for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings; and
[18.] To make All Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.

United States Constitution Article II, Section 2
Sec. 2. [Commander-in-Chief — Pardons — Treaties —
Appointment of officers.]
[1.1 The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any
Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have
power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States,
except in Cases of Impeachment.
[2.] He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and
he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or
in the Heads of Departments.
[3.] The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall
expire at the End of their next Session.

United States Constitution Article III, Section 2

Sec. 2. [Extent of judicial power — Supreme Court —
Trial and places of trial.]
[1.] The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—[between a State and
Citizens of another State;]—between Citizens of different States,—between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
[and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.]
[2.] In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme

Utah Constitution Article V, Section 1
ARTICLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
Section
1. [Three departments of government.]

Section 1. [Three departments of government.]
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial;
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Executive department, Utah Const., Art. VII.
Judicial department, Utah Const., Art. VIII.

Legislative department, Utah Const., Art.
VI.
Municipal powers not delegable, Utah
Const., Art. VI, § 28.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999)

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be -in the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight aRer the attempt or commission of a
robbery.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-302, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, 5 76-6-302; 1975, ch. 51, § 1;
1989, ch. 170, § 7; 1994, ch. 271, § 1.

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)
Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense
to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;

(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion
to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to
the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by
the court.
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence
is not binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the
proposed disposition will be approved.
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002.)
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 021906524

Plaintiff,
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PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

6

vs.
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ALEX MONTIEL,

(Videotape Proceedings)
Defendant.
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 13th day of
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December, 2002, commencing at the hour of 9:15 a.m., the
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON, sitting as Judge in the
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that
the following videotape proceedings were had.
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BYRON F. BURMESTER
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District Attorney
231 East 400 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah
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Attorney at Law
Salt Lake Legal Defender
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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. BUCHI:

Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Good morning.

MS. BUCHI:

Your Honor, if we could call Montiel,

No. 21 on your calendar.
THE COURT: We can.

Let's wait a minute until my

clerk gets back.
MS. BUCHI:

Okay.

THE COURT: We're on No. 21, Alex Montiel.

State of

Utah vs. Alex Montiel, this is Case No. 02190655—or 6524.
It's on for final pre-trial. We have a trial on next Monday,
I believe.
MS. BUCHI:

It is, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Have we got Alex Montiel?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

We do, but he says he's

(inaudible)
THE COURT:

No. What he has to do is come out.

MS. BUCHI:

Your Honor, if I can approach.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. MONTIEL:

THE COURT:

You are Alex Montiel?

Yes.

All right.

I take it from what you've

handed me, we're going to trial next Monday?
MS. BUCHI:

We are prepared to, your Honor.

THE COURT:

The State ready?
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MR. BURMESTER:
THE COURT:
9:00 o'clock.

Yes, your Honor.

Okay.

Counsel and the defendant here at

You'll have the appropriate attire for Mr.

Montiel?
MS. BUCHI:

Yes, I will, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

I want everybody here at 9:30

because I'll have the jury up here at 10:00 o'clock ready to
go.
I have the defendant's proposed instructions and
proposed voir dire and if the State has any instructions, they
can bring them first morning.
Okay.

Anything else we need to talk about in this

case;
MS. BUCHI:

I don't believe so, your Honor.

THE COURT:

State have anything else?

MR. BURMESTER:

Nothing from the State, your Honor.

THE COURT:

See you at 9:30 on Monday.

MS. BUCHI:

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

That's all that

I have,

(Off the record.
THE COURT:

Ms. Buchi?

MS. BUCHI:

Good morning, your Honor.

If we could

return to the matter of Alex Montiel, we have a resolution.
THE COURT:

What's the plan here?

3

Give me the file back on Montiel, will you please,
Evelyn?
What's the reason we're doing this?
MR. BURMESTER:
reasons.

Your Honor, there are a couple of

The first is, there are some facts that are—make

the story not as presentable to the jury and I would rather
accept the—the lesser plea than run the risk of (inaudible)
THE COURT:

Well, you—well, you've charged him with

aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, and that—and the
allegations, as I read the probable cause statement is that
11

\ the defendant used a firearm, which would enhance that, and
also that he committed a crime with four other persons, which
would enhance that again.

And—and the State wants to drop

this down to a third-degree felony?
Well, I don't waive firearms enhancements, folks.
You plead them, they're stuck unless I'm convinced that there
was some mistake in pleading.

And this probable cause

statement says that Mr. Montiel produced a gun and held it to
the victim's head and while he was being—while he was being
robbed by the rest of them.
MS. BUCHI:

Your Honor, there's also the additional

reason that Mr. Montiel—Mr. Burmester and I have done prior
to re-trial with Mr. Montiel, he was interested in knowing if
there was any offer and I approached Mr. Burmester and we
talked about it.

I guess in terms of judicial economy as

4

well.
THE COURT:

I don't care about judicial economy when

people are alleged to have used firearms in the commission of
a crime.

I'll take whatever time is necessary to resolve the

issue properly.
I'm not going to waive the firearms enhancement.
Unless you can tell me you don't have any evidence that he
didn't have a firearm or there wasn't a firearm or your
witness is lying.
MR. BURMESTER:

No, your Honor.

matter of weighing—weighing the case.

It's just—just a

I mean, there are

facts—that is the story that is told by the—by the
complaining witness.
THE COURT:

And if it's true, it's a serious crime.

MR. BURMESTER:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Absolutely.

A bunch of guys jumped this guy walking

down the road and put a gun to his head.
MR. BURMESTER:

Absolutely, your Honor, but there

are also facts and as—as you're well aware with your many
years of experience as a trial lawyer, sometimes it's better
to have the—the verdict in hand than—than two in the bush.
And there's sometimes that the jury may just say, oh, to heck
with this and—and they lose it.
I think this person is a dangerous person. My
objective, I think, and my duties to the taxpayers of the

5

State is to take this person, who I believe to be a dangerous
person, and lock him up.

That is my objective and I think

this i s —
THE COURT:

Lock him up for zero to five, what kind

of a deal is that?
MR. BURMESTER:

It's better than zero to zero, your

Honor, and that's—that's just what I—where I'm at, I'm
(inaudible)
THE COURT:

I assume you've run this by Mr. Yocom?

MR. BURMESTER:
THE COURT:

I've run it by Mr. Morgan.

Is he the one that does those things?

MR. BURMESTER:

Yes.

There—there is a part

committee, but in the event we have a short-term situation,
then it's—
THE COURT:

What does the victim say about this?

MR. BURMESTER:

I have not talked to the victim

about this particular one, although I've talked to* the victim
previously about offering a second (inaudible)
THE COURT:

Remember the case that Justice Wilkins

wrote where he accused the District Attorney's office and the
trial judge of running rampant over victim's rights by not
telling them what's going on and that little fiasco out in
Tooele?

I don't think Mr. Yocom wants to have to undergo that

again without at least an opportunity to look at this.
I don't.

And I'm not (inaudible).

6

I know

We haven't even told—we

haven't even told the person who claims all these things
occurred as to what are you going to do.

I think he's

entitled to know.
I'm not going to allow the filing of this amended
Information at this point and I'm not going to accept any plea
to a third-degree felony on the basis of what I've heard.

The

case goes to trial Monday.
MR. BURMESTER:

Thank you, your Honor.

MS. BUCHI: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. BURMESTER:

Your Honor, I'm not sure if the

Court cares, here's a witness list and I know the Court is
concerned about that as alleged.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. BURMESTER:

Very good.

Thank you.

Your Honor, I just didn't—this case

is not the usual, so I did not prepared proposed voir dire.
I—(inaudible) the Court stocks.
THE COURT:

I'm sure we can cover that.

MR. BURMESTER:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

See you Monday.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

* * *
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Thank you.
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